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Abstract 
In the standard moral hazard model, withholding of effort by the agent is not 
observable to the principal. We argue that this assumption has to be changed in 
applications that study corruption. The overwhelming majority of cases where 
corrupt politicians have been punished involve the detection of consumption 
levels that appear to be too high. The informativeness of an agent’s level of 
consumption depends on his initial level of wealth as conspicuous consumption 
of luxuries by wealthy agents leads to little updating of the principal’s belief 
about their honesty. This introduces a tendency to choose poor agents as they 
are easier to monitor. More generally, we show that, even if agents have similar 
preferences, there are contractual advantages to selecting particular types. We 
describe the basic problem of choosing agents and monitoring consumption, 
and discuss a number of features of the practical applications. We show that 
selecting rich politicians may not help fight corruption and that the political 
class will exhibit lower variance in consumption than the population. In settings 
were formal contracts matter, we show that monitoring consumption introduces 
a tendency towards low powered incentive schemes (and more generally low 
wages) and that the measure of “moral” costs that is often employed in the 
literature can be derived (not assumed). 
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I. Introduction 
 
Castrated slaves, called eunuchs, were employed by Sultans to guard their harems. This 
solution to a particularly distressing principal-agent problem is one instance of a general 
strategy that can be called choosing agents. In this strategy, the principal selects an agent, on 
whom he is about to delegate a task, based on an observable characteristic. In the standard 
agency model it is clear that the agent’s degree of risk aversion can be costly to the principal. 
Perhaps because of the difficulty in observing risk aversion, economists have emphasized 
other potential benefits of using particular agents. Schelling (1960), for example, discusses 
the use of agents with a low personal cost of conflict and mentions the strategic advantages 
of delegating authority “to a military commander of known motivation”. More recently, Vickers 
(1985) emphasizes the potential value of hiring a manager that is committed to maximize the 
company’s sales instead of profits. Similarly, Rogoff (1985) analyses the benefits of 
delegating the conduct of monetary policy to a conservative central banker in a setting where 
there is time inconsistency, while Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) study how hiring a manager 
biased towards pursuing certain type of projects (a “visionary”) helps employees exert effort 
on innovative tasks. In all these examples there is a commitment benefit of choosing agents 
with particular preferences. In this paper we focus on the contractual benefits of choosing 
certain agents out of a population of similar preferences. The example of the eunuch 
illustrates an extreme example whereby selecting some agent eliminates the principal agent 
problem altogether. In general, the amount of rents left to the agent and/or the efficiency 
costs of the optimal incentive scheme will depend on the agent’s observable characteristics. 
We are particularly concerned with applications to corruption, where a strategy of choosing 
agents is often employed in practice. Although all our examples come from corruption 
settings, it is possible that there are more general benefits from using observable 
characteristics to help reduce the informational costs.
2 
 
The corruption literature has discussed the effects of higher income on the behavior of 
agents that work in positions where there are opportunities to take bribes. This is the theme, 
for example, of the early seminal paper of Becker and Stigler (1974), as well as Rasmusen 
                                                 
2 For example, a firm may prefer to collude with a small rather than a large rival as deviations from an 
agreement by a small firm may be easier to observe. We thank Hugo Hopenhayn for suggesting this example.   3
(1992), Besley and McLaren (1993) and Mookherjee and Png (1995), and the large policy 
literature discussing how paying higher wages can reduce corruption (see, for example, 
World Bank (1997)). The idea is linked to standard economic intuition through diminishing 
marginal utility. There are also a number of examples of very wealthy individuals that have 
been elected in countries where corruption is an important political preoccupation. One the 
famous cases is that of Silvio Berlusconi, who was elected prime minister in Italy of 1994, in 
the aftermath of tangentopoli, the corruption scandals that shocked the Italian political 
establishment in the early nineties. The owner of a vast business empire, Berlusconi’s 
acknowledged net annual earnings at the time were U$13.5 million. 
 
There is, however, a second effect of wealth. It is illustrated by the actions of the leaders of 
the popular uprising against President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines in 1986. After 
finding a number of luxury items at the presidential palace, including 2,300 pairs of shoes in 
First Lady Imelda Marcos’ closet, they decided to protect and exhibit them, together with all 
of the contents as evidence of corruption on a grand-scale by the Marcos’.
3 They reasoned 
that, since Marcos was not a wealthy man before entering politics, these items where 
probably acquired with dishonest income. Put differently, finding 2,300 pairs of shoes in Mrs 
Berlusconi’s closet, would make her an eccentric rather than a crook. Interestingly, this is the 
logic used in the overwhelming majority of the cases where corruption has been detected 
and punished. As part of a mild campaign against corruption in the early 1980’s, the Mexican 
government charged (in absentia) the former chief of police of Mexico City with fraud. One 
of the reasons for the charges was his high standard of living. Apparently he was able to 
keep 15 racehorses and 19 vintage cars in his home. He also had 1,200 servants and had a 
second home modeled (in marble) on the Parthenon, all whilst on a U$1,000 monthly salary.
4 
The biggest spy scandal in the CIA’s history occurred when counter espionage agents 
inquired how one of their top agents, Aldrich Ames, was able to afford a Ferrari. In the end, 
Ames’ luxurious lifestyle prompted an investigation that uncovered the sale of secrets to the 
Soviet Union on the largest scale ever. Amongst these secrets was a list of CIA agents that 
were subsequently killed by the Soviets.
5 According to Judge Gherardo Colombo from 
                                                 
3 Ex-President Marcos, however, has always denied allegations suggesting he was worth U$10bn (based on 
papers found at the palace). He has only admitted to owning assets worth U$2bn. See The Times, June 12, 1986. 
4 Reported in The Economist, April 7, 1984. 
5 Reported in the front page of The Times, December 29, 1994.   4
Milan, a former prosecutor in the “mani pulite” process, the value of monitoring the assets 
and lifestyles of public officials is one of the key lessons of the Italian experience. A recent 
paper summarizing the main practical issues (Colombo (1997)) goes further and argues that 
this is the only approach with some chance of success.
6 
 
This argument can be put in terms of the traditional moral hazard model. It suggests that 
applying it to study corruption requires more than a mere re-labeling of effort for bribes 
because withholding effort is unobservable while bribe consumption may be observable in 
some type of agents (the poor or those on very low wages). A direct implication is that there 
may be other quasi-observable characteristics of the agent that may facilitate this 
transmission of information besides their income, such as the agent’s rate of discount. We 
conjecture that agent’s with children, or with sick relatives may be easier to monitor, as they 
would have a higher tendency to consume education and health care services.  
 
In the next section we describe the general problem and a measure of the gain from 
choosing agents to lay down the basic idea. Given that high-level politicians typically are 
bound by informal contracts, whereas lower level bureaucrats are motivated through formal 
incentive contracts, we separate the channels through which choosing agent matters into 
two. First, in the absence of a formal contract, monitoring consumption will still lead some 
type of agents to behave better than others. Second, writing a formal incentive contract may 
be cheaper to write for some type of agents. In section III we study informal contracts and 
show that we should not always expect lower corruption levels from richer politicians. In 
section IV we develop the case of formal contracts and show that the observability of the 
hidden action leads incentive contacts motivated to reduce bureaucratic corruption to have 
low power. This is an argument against paying high wages to deter corruption. The main 
point of the paper naturally leads to a distinction between money earned legally and money 
earned illegally, something that we argue is a natural interpretation of the “moral costs” that 
are used in the analysis of corruption since the work of Rose-Ackerman (1975).  
 
                                                 
6 The secret nature of corrupt agreements, the fact the victims (taxpayers) are dispersed and there are incentives 
for free riding, the fact that penalties are stipulated to both those receiving bribes and those giving them, all 
conspire to make corruption a crime with extremely low rates of indictments.   5
II. The Basic Problem of Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption 
 
II.a. Basic Problem 
Assume that a principal wishes to hire an agent to do some task. The agent’s original 
observable characteristic is 
0. i t  The resulting observable characteristic of the agent after the 
implementation of payment scheme r  by the principal is  
0 (,) . ii tt r The principal chooses a 
payment scheme 
* r  and an agent with original characteristic 
0
i t
∗ such that 
 
0* * 0 ,m a x ( , ( , ) ) ip i tr A r g Ur a t r





00 (, ) m a x ( , ,(, ) ) ia i i atr A r g Ur a ttr
∗ ∈   
 
The principal’s utility,  (.) p U , depends on the payment scheme (r ) and the agent’s optimal 
action (a
* ). And the agent’s utility   (.) a U  depends on the payment scheme, the agent’s action 
and the resulting characteristic. 
 
A way to solve this problem, in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1993), is to find the 
optimal payment scheme for each type and then choose the optimal type. Guided by the 
empirical applications which involve cases of high level (political) corruption as well as low-
level (bureaucratic) corruption, we distinguish two channels through which the principal 
benefits from using observable characteristics. First, even in the absence of formal contract, 
some agents will be more inclined to choose the actions desired by the principal. Second, 
some agents are cheaper to motivate through a formal incentive contract. We develop two 
simplified versions of these problems, designed to highlight the two channels.  
 
To illustrate the first channel, we look for the optimal characteristic assuming that the 
principal cannot choose the formal payment scheme. In this case the solution is such that 
   6
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The principal’s utility depends on the agent’s action, while the agent’s utility depends on the 
action and the original characteristic. The lack of formal contracts is common in high level 
political settings, where corruption is often a preoccupation. In this context, it is sometimes 
conjectured that there may be practical advantages to selecting wealthy politicians who will 
not be tempted to become corrupt (although there may be costs in terms of a lower political 
legitimacy). Note that in this case, there are no benefits originating in the fact that the 
principal can write a different (cheaper) contract for some type of agents, but rather from 
the fact that some agents are more likely to take a desired action. Note that this general 
description includes the case of agents who take particular actions due to the informal 
incentives they face. And also the cases of agents whose preferences make them select 
actions that have commitment value (as with Rogoff’s conservative central banker and 
Rotemberg and Saloner’s visionaries). 
 
To illustrate the second channel, we develop an example with homogeneous agents (there 
are no differences in the original characteristic) where the principal designs a formal 
incentive contract.  The focus is on the way the payment scheme affects the resulting 
characteristic and hence how easy it will be to observe consumption for the principal. The 
solution is given by 
 
  max ( , ( , )) pi rA r g U r a t r




  (, ) m a x (,,) ia i atr A r g Ur a t
∗ ∈   
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The utility of the principal depends on the payment scheme and the agent’s action. The 
utility of the agent depends on the contract and on the resulting characteristic. The emphasis 
on formal contracts to deter corruption is common in bureaucracies. In this context, it is 
sometimes observed that bureaucracies are characterized by the use of low powered 
incentive schemes (e.g., Tirole (1993)). And raising wages for bureaucrats, as well as for 
politicians, is one of the most popular policy proposals to fight corruption. In this example, 
the benefits originate in the fact that a contract that takes into account a (given) 
characteristic and monitors consumption is cheaper for the principal. Different types may 
certainly be associated with differences in how big such benefits are, but the two channels 
are conceptually different. 
 
II.b. Measure of the Gain from Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption 
In the general case the gains from choosing agents and monitoring consumption to the 
principal is  
 
() ( ) ( )
*0 * *0 ** *0 0 (0) ( ), ( , ) , ( , )
av av
pi i p i i M Ur t a tr Ura t r d G t =− ∫  
 
where r
av is the payment scheme that maximizes principal’s utility given that it cannot be 
made contingent on the type, and where 
0 () i Gt  is the cumulative distribution function of 
types.  
 
In the case where incentive contracts are not used (or are not tailored to each characteristic), 
the gain from choosing agents is  
 
()( ) ( ) ∫ − =
0 0 * * 0 * ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( i i p i p t dG t a U t a U M  
 
These gains are only going to be zero when the principal is indifferent among all types.  
 
In the case where incentive contracts are tailored to the characteristics of the agent, a 
measure of the gain has two components. First, we have the gain from having a contract that 
fits the characteristic, even though the latter may not be the optimal one. This is given by    8
 
() ( ) ( )
*0 *0 * 0 0 *0 0 ( 2) () , (, ) () () , (, )
ii
av av
pi p i i i M aU r t a t r d G t U r t a t rd G t =− ∫∫. 
 
These gains are only going to be zero when the optimal payment scheme is the same for all 
types.  
 
Second, we have the gain from choosing the optimal characteristic.  
 
() ( )
*0 * *0 ** *0 *0 * 0 (2 ) ( ), ( , ) ( ), ( , ) ( ) pi i pi i i M b U rt at r U rt atr d G t =− ∫  
 
Note that the gain in the general case,  (0) M , can be quite large. Consider the standard 
problem of inducing an agent to exert effort in a task. Now allow for the possibility that 
agents differ in their skin pigmentation and that the only way to enjoy leisure is to spend 
time under the sun. In this case white agents are to be preferred to black agents, as white 
agents would exhibit sunburns if they were to withhold effort on the job, whereas black 
agents would exhibit no change in color. In this extreme example, the gain from choosing 
agents and monitoring consumption is  (0) M . This is so because using a black agent takes us 
to the traditional principal agent model and using a white agent takes us to a world where 
there are no principal agent problems because not providing effort is always fully revealed to 
the principal. When the agents find it very costly to have no leisure at all, the optimal 
contract will include some leisure (besides a monetary payment). Interestingly, it will differ 
between the two types with white agents having relatively less time under the sun than black 
agents. The reason is that allowing white agents to spend time under the sun is more 
“expensive” since it would reduce the information that is transmitted to the principal when 
the agent withholds effort. 
 
 
III. No Contract, Choice of Agent: Politician wealth may not help control corruption 
 
In this section we consider the possibility of corruption in a setting where formal contracts 
cannot be written (by assumption), so this is an example of only choosing the agent’s   9
characteristics, as explained in section II. The setup we consider has the advantage of being 
applicable to cases of corruption by high level officials and politicians, an area where there 
has been comparatively little research done. The only thing the public can do is to monitor 
the agent’s consumption patterns, which are affected both by the bribes he takes and by the 
random changes to his wealth.  
 
Consider an agent that is paid a fixed wage (normalized to zero) who has the opportunity to 
choose the amount of bribes b  to take. For concreteness, consider the case of a high level, 
elected politician in charge of privatizing a state enterprise that can under-invoice the sale 
without leaving any proof of wrongdoing.
7  
 
Assume the agent has a stock of wealth t, that produces a flow of honest income freely 
available for consumption, v. While wealth is verifiable, the amount v is not observable to 
the public. A number of factors affect the size of the income realizationv, including the 
returns to his legitimate investments and the amount of gifts the agent may receive like 
inheritance. After observing the return to his wealth v, the agent decides to take bribes in 
the amount b , for a total amount of income available of vb + . This is fully spent on 
consumption,  z , as allowing for savings somewhat complicates the analysis without adding 




A standard way to think of z is as consumption on luxury goods, such as spending on fancy 
cars or golden watches. However, successful cases of corruption detection, suggest including 
goods on which consumption cannot be postponed. Indeed one of the lessons of the mani 
pulite investigations is the usefulness of monitoring spending on activities that have a very 
high discount rate, such as the education of children or spending on medical care (see 
Colombo (1997)). This reduces the possibility of having the agent shifting consumption 
                                                 
7 We do not model the source of the agent’s power because we do not need so much detail to lay down the 
basic ideas. All we need is a situation where the politician can take bribes, and that he has complete legal 
discretion to do so. In other words, the politician runs no risk of detection or of ever receiving any form of 
legal punishments. The assumption is a bit extreme, but given the extraordinary low rate of detection of 
corruption, seems a reasonable first approximation.   10
across time. Although we assume that there is no (verifiable) trace of the agent’s corrupt 
activities, we do assume the agent’s consumption of luxuries is observable (presumably, that 
is the point with luxury goods). When the public observes these displays of wealth, it doesn’t 
know if the agent was lucky or if he took bribes.
8 Thus, the state of the world where the 
agent takes bribes and inherits nothing is observationally equivalent for the public to the 
state where the agent takes no bribes and receives inheritance. 
 
We assume that the variable v, the return to wealth, is distributed with a certain distribution 
function; that this is common knowledge; and that this induces a distribution function over 
z  that we denote with  () Fz. Call the associated density function  () f z . 
 
The agent’s objective function is 
 
() (,) I Uz Ftzm =−  
 
The function  (.) U  is the agent’s utility function that satisfies standard Inada conditions. The 
second term represents punishment for suspicions of corruption. When the public observes 
the politician’s level of consumption, it calculates the probability that such a level was 
generated with zero bribes. The agent is punished by the public with reductions to their 
moral prestige (in units of utility) in the amount m . A simple interpretation is that  (.) F  is 
the probability of dishonesty and m  is the personal cost of the public’s lack of trust, 
possibly expressed as the number of votes.
9 
 
The timeline is as follows. 
 
choose agent with 
wealth t 
inheritance v  agent chooses bribes b   
public observes consumption z 
payoffs are made 
 
                                                 
8 When asked about his 2,300 pairs of shoes, Marcos can always claim that he inherited money from a relative 
or invested his salary wisely. 
9 A simple game where this punishment scheme is optimal is the game of keeper of the treasure. A guard is in 
charge of protecting the kingdom's treasure from some thieves. After they leave with their pickings, the guard 
confronts the king and reports how much was stolen. The king can only observe the guard's standard of living 
before and after the raid, and reward the guard with honors, status, etc.   11
First the public chooses a politician from a pool of agents that can only be distinguished by 
their wealth. Second, the random realization to wealth is revealed to the politician. Third, the 
politician chooses a level of bribes and total consumption of luxuries is revealed to the 
public.
10 Lastly, the payoffs to the politician and the public are made. 
 
Agent’s Choice 
The problem for a politician that observes a realization equal to v is to 
 
b Max I  
 
The first order condition is 
 
´( , ) 0 Uf t z m −=  
 
The agent equates the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal punishment for 
exhibiting conspicuous consumption. This punishment is simply the change in the 
probability the agent is considered corrupt times the punishment implied by these beliefs. 
Indeed, since the public cannot see what part of the politician’s consumption pattern 
originates in a genuine wealth realization and what part originates in a bribe, it must punish 
all displays of “excessive” consumption. The agent observes the shock to his wealth and 
decides what the level of bribes he should take is. Note that this may imply negative bribes. 
The interpretation in this case is that negative bribes represent attempts by the agent to 
conceal his wealth. In normal circumstances the agent would certainly consume according to 
his wealth realization, but his chosen profession (of politician) means that he will have to 
abstain.
11 Calling these activities “negative bribes” is less odd than it seems. Since all the 
public can see is displays of conspicuous consumption, all the distinctions must be made in 
one plane: we must either have positive and negative bribes or positive and negative 
                                                 
10 The main conclusions of the paper do not change if the timing is changed to allow the politician to observe 
the wealth realization after deciding on the amount of bribes. 
11 The conversation is as follows: 
WIFE: Darling, why don't we go to Cancun for the holidays? You know we can afford it this year as my father 
is paying for it. 
POLITICIAN: I know but, what will the people say?   12
consumption, which also sounds involved.
12 
 
Since we are not restricting  (.) F  in any way or form (beyond the standard  (0) 0 F =  and 
()1 F ∞=),  in order to ensure that the solution is an interior one we assume that for all the 
types, exists a b <∞ such that  () ( ,) ( ) Uv b Ftv bm U m + −+ > ∞ − .
13 Note that the 
conditions on the utility and distribution functions imply that we must have positive bribes 
at  0 v = . Given the sequence of play, bribes are monotonically decreasing in the realization 
of income, v. A more general result, which is also empirically testable, is the political class 
exhibits less variance in the consumption of luxuries than the non-political population. In 
fact, in the extreme example we present the variance is zero (for a given level of wealth). It is 
also straightforward to see that if z  is separated into different goods, each with a different 
discount rate, there will be more consumption of goods with a high discount rate. 
  
Agent Participation 
The agent’s participation constraint is  
 
() ( )() () ,, ( ) , Uv b Ft v b mft vd v Uvft vd v
∗∗ ⎡⎤ +− + ≥ ⎣⎦ ∫∫  
 
Note that monitoring consumption has the effect of introducing a form of punishment for 
people who choose to enter politics that they would otherwise not have. Accordingly, the 
public has a smaller set of agents from which to elect its leaders. We could not obtain 
general conditions under which such a constraint binds more for particular groups (e.g., the 
rich). 
 
On this account, the model predicts that countries with more access to information about 
the lifestyle of politicians would tend to have less people interested in becoming politicians. 
For example, a practical decision that countries must make is if the statement requiring 
politicians of disclose their wealth prior to entering politics is going to be made public (such 
                                                 
12 What may be misleading is that a “negative bribe”' sounds like the agent is returning some ill-gotten gains to 
the public. No such thing happens in this model. As we emphasized, the agent simply engages in a sub-optimal 
pattern of consumption from a personal point of view. 
13 Of course, the first order condition could hold for any number of values of the realization.   13
as in the US) or will not (such as in the UK prior to the 1990’s). Cultural habits that allow 
media enquiry would again have the benefit of monitoring consumption but the cost of 
reducing the pool of potential politicians. 
 
The Public’s Problem 
Faced with this behavior by the agent, the public must choose a politician with a level of 
wealth such that expected bribes are a minimum. The public has very little information 
about the agent’s activities, and its objective function is accordingly simple. The public may 
have a number of specific objectives in mind, but may be unable to combine them 
analytically when designing the optimal compensation package. Thus, concentrating on bribe 
taking is the best it can do. Alternatively, the public may have very little information about 
the structure of uncertainty faced by the politician, or the agent’s responsibilities could be 
secret, so there is actually no practical way to do this.  
 
Call  1() vt the level of the wealth realization for which we have  1 (( ) ) 0 bvt
∗ = . Then the 
probability of the agent being corrupt is 
 
() () 1 , F tv t  
 




0 ,. . a r g m a x
vt
B bv t ft vbd vs tb I
∗∗ ∗ =+ ∈ ∫  
 
Thus the problem of the public is to 
 
t Min B 
() ( )() () .. , , ( ) ,
argmax








The first constraint is a participation constraint to ensure the agent is willing to take part in   14
political life and the second is an incentive constraint. This leads us to our basic proposition 
 
 
Proposition 1: The effect of increasing the agent’s wealth on 
1. the probability that he takes bribes is ambiguous 
2. the expected total bribes that he takes is ambiguous. 
 
Proof: The expressions for both  1 (, () )/ dF t v t dt  and  / dB dt  cannot be signed.   ■ 
 
Wealth affects bribe taking in our simple model in two ways. First we have that richer agents 
would tend to take lower bribes because of diminishing marginal utility. The second effect of 
wealth operates through reducing the punishment of conspicuous consumption to the 
richer, since is less indicative of malfeasance. Proposition 1 shows that, from the point of 
view of controlling corruption, there is no reason to prefer richer agents. More precisely, 
F(t,z) is decreasing in t, which means that for the same level of consumption the rich gets a 
lower punishment. If this were not true, and for example we would have F(t,z)=F(z) for all t, 
then the level of consumption 
* z  would be the same for all types. This means that poorer 
agents would be getting more bribes (both in size and frequency) and it would always pay to 
hire a richer agent. Thus, when richer people can hide better the bribes they have obtained 
they will tend to bribe more, so the level of wealth of the agent that maximizes the public’s 
utility becomes an empirical question. It is possible that this point is connected to the 
anecdotal evidence we have, which does not suggest that richer politicians have an 
overwhelming advantage over poor ones when it comes to anti-corruption debates. 
 
Proposition 1 may not be very surprising given that we have not imposed any restrictions on 
(.) F  and its relationship to wealth. However, most reasonable assumptions leave this result 
unchanged. This is the case if we assume, for instance, that the variance of income increases 
with wealth.
14 This is what we expect to happen if we think that the income generated by a 
certain amount of wealth is a fixed percentage term of the original amount, such as when we 
                                                 
14 If we do not assume this we may have that agents that are worth $10 may have $9 in a bad year and $11 in a 
good year, but an agent worth $1,000 is worth $1,001 in a good year and $999 in a bad one.   15
can express returns as plus or minus x%. It is also possible to think of the v term as 
inheritance. Then this assumption is equivalent to assuming that wealth is correlated across 
family members or that rich people have rich aunts. Proposition 1 remains true even if we 
assume other relationships between t and  (.) F . For example, we cannot sign the effect of 
wealth on corruption even if we assume that higher wealth implies first order stochastic 
dominance.  
 
At least two important features are missing from our formulation. First, the agent may be a 
self made man, so that wealth may be a signal of ability. The model, however, does not make 
a distinction between these two types of wealth. This, by itself, does not introduce a 
tendency to prefer the self made over those with inherited wealth. The reason is that 
individual “ability” may have negative value for society, as in the case of the ability required 
to pay/get bribes. Maybe the self-made have an ability to understand the bribing technology, 
or less condemning in moral terms of such activities. Some of the reservations to Premier 
Silvio Berlusconi could be interpreted in this light, as his companies have been accused of 
bribe paying. Second, we have not allowed for strategic manipulation of the wealth 
information made available by the agent prior to taking his job. In many countries there are 
provisions whereby agents must make a formal statement of their wealth upon taking a job 
in the public sector (above a certain level). Such statements are sometimes public, facilitating 
monitoring consumption to deter corruption. Agents could jam the signals they will later 
produce by claiming to be wealthy when entering politics. However, it may be 
difficult/costly for agents to do this. The public may want to actually observe conspicuous 
consumption and the agent may be liquidity constrained (obviously it would be hard to fund 
such investment projects in the formal finance sector). Also, declaring prior wealth may be 




                                                 
15 One could question that agents have such extended planning horizons. However, the experience of Indira 
Gandhi's chief Minister in the State of Maharashi (Mr Antulay) suggests otherwise. Apparently, he was forced 
to resign after a high court in Bombay found him guilty of selling cement quotas established by the 
government. The mechanism used was to ask for “donations” to the trusts he controlled. He “had established 
seven trusts, ostensibly for public purposes, but in fact completely controlled by himself. He had obtained income tax exemptions for 
one trust amounting to U$110m over the next three years - an indication of the amount he expected generous donors to contribute'' 
(reported in p. 51 of The Economist, January 23, 1982).   16
IV. Optimal Contract, Same Agent: High wages may not help control corruption 
 
In this section we study the role of formal contracts. This has some relevance because 
improving the salaries of public officials is often emphasized as a way to fight corruption.
16 
The main argument in these debates is the same emphasized by economists, namely that 
bureaucrats will not engage in risky activities, such as bribe taking, when there is a wage 
premium to working in the public sector (see, for example, Becker and Stigler (1974), 
Dickens et al (1989), Besley and McLaren (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1995), inter alia; for 
the cross country empirical evidence see van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001)).  
 
This policy, however, has problems. For example, for plausible parameter values, wages 
would have to be extremely high to deter corruption. This is due to a combination of the 
very low detection probabilities on crimes of bribery and the large amounts of money that 
can potentially be embezzled by the bureaucrats. In practice, there are very few examples of 
countries where politicians earn the kind of money that could deter corruption on this 
logic.
17 One possible reason is that a policy of high wages for politicians does not carry much 
favor with the public. The rhetoric suggests this resistance originates in fairness 
considerations, although it is worth remembering that a stylized fact of bureaucracies, which 
are more insulated from the public than elected politicians, is the low power of incentive 
schemes (see, for example, Wilson (1989) and Tirole (1994)). 
 
In this section we point to another practical problem with a formal contract that gives out 
generous monetary rewards to politicians. To do this we derive the optimal payment scheme 
when higher consumption levels provide information about the agent’s hidden action and 
compare it to the contract in the standard case where the agent’s subsequent consumption is 
uninformative. To emphasize the main point on how formal contracts change when 
consumption is informative, we now assume that agents are homogeneous in terms of type 
                                                 
16 World Bank (1997) is one of many examples. The approach is also a favorite of the popular press. For 
example, wage increases are a part of the current effort to reduce corruption in the Mexican federal police. See 
“Reforming Mexico’s police”, The Economist, December 11, 1999. 
17 The country that pays highest wages to high level politicians is Singapore, which does not rank well in civic 
liberties (according to Freedom House). In 1994, for example, it was reported that the annual salary of Goh 
Chok Tong, Singapore's prime minister, was $780,000, almost four times that of Bill Clinton. Starting annual   17
(e.g., wealth, etc). Note that a similar point can be made in the context of a model where 
payments cannot be state contingent. Indeed, in an efficiency wage model, the observability 
of consumption leads to lower wages and to more investment by the principal in increasing 
the detection probability (results available upon request). The intuition is that, when 
consumption is not observable, the cost of increasing the wage one dollar is just this dollar. 
But when high wages reduce the informativeness of monitoring consumption there is an 
additional cost from the reduction in the probability of detection. We start with the standard 
case where the principal does not observe consumption ex-post, which also serves as the 
benchmark. 
 
IV.a. No Information in Consumption (benchmark)  
The principal offers the agent a contract. If he accepts, his task is to observe the realization 
of a variable (say the level of revenue) Π, which can be high  h Π  (with probability  h p ) or 
low  l Π  (with probability  l p ). He then makes a report 
a Π . The agent’s only discretion 
occurs when the state is high, as he may report it is low (and keep the difference). The 
alternative occupation earns him  0 w . The incentive scheme used by the principal is 
()
a
hh ww Π= Π =  and  ()
a
ll ww Π= Π = . When the principal does not observe 
consumption, the agent will report the truth when  () ( ) hl h l Uw Uw ≥+ Π − Π . And will agree 
to participate when  () ( ) ( ) 0 hhll p Uw p Uw Uw +≥ . 
 
Denote  (.) ψ  the inverse of U. Since U is an increasing and concave function, it is easy to see 



















                                                                                                                                                 
salaries for cabinet ministers were $419,285 (over three times that of UK prime minister at the time). They were 
raised 25% in 1995. Reported in The Economist, November 26th, 1994.   18
IV.b. Observing Consumption  
To model the fact that consumption is (partially) revealing, we assume that there is some 
noise in the agent’s level of legal income. For example, the agent invests his wage and earns a 
random return. This is given by  
 
income φ×  
 
where  φ  is the realization of random variable Φ. To emphasize this, we alter the timing 
(with respect to the one used in section III) and assume that the agent makes his decision to 
become corrupt prior to observing the realization of this random variable. A second 
difference is that we now assume that the agent must consume his total income. Thus, he 
cannot hide the bribe and must consume it under the eyes of the public. Neither of these 
assumptions is essential but help simplify the exposition. The probability that the agent has 
taken bribes is derived given the agent’s legal income and observed consumption level, and 
he is punished for such suspicions with a punishment m. Thus, total punishment is given by  
 
(, ) F legal income consumption m ×  
 
where the first term is the probability that 
consumption
legal income
Φ≤ . The agent’s utility is 
 
() () () , U total income F legal income total income m φφ −  
 






nature chooses investment return (not 
observable by the principal) 




When the agent observes  h Π  , the incentive compatibility constraint is  
   19
[( ) ( , )] [( ( ) ) (,( ) )] h h h lhl l lhl Uw F w w m d U w F w w m d φ φφ φ φ φ −≥ + Π − Π − + Π − Π ∫∫  
 
Note that legal income increases the agent’s utility through two channels. First, we have the 
standard effect operating through higher consumption. Second, higher income reduces the 
popularity penalty because a given level of consumption is less likely to originate in 
corruption by the agent.  
 
Comparing the optimal payment scheme when consumption is informative and when it is 
not, we obtain the following proposition,  
 
Proposition 2: The optimal contract when consumption is informative has lower power than the optimal 
contract in the benchmark case when consumption is not informative. 
 
 
Proof: We can rewrite the incentive compatibility constraint as follows 
 
  [ ( ) ( ( ))] [ ( , ) ( , ( ))] h lhl h h l lhl Uw U w d m F w w F w w d φ φφ φ φφ −+ Π − Π ≥ − + Π − Π ∫∫  
 
When this constraint is not binding, the principal gives the agent a constant wage that 
minimizes expected costs (as the agent is risk averse and punishment through m  is enough 










⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ +Π −Π
Φ≤ − Φ≤ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣⎦ ∫  
 












 and the probability 
is an increasing function. (The reason is thatΦ, the realization of the uncertainty about the 
agent’s legal income, is independent of the agent’s behavior, and because for any realization,   20
the public’s punishment is higher when the agent announces l Π ). The left hand side is also 
less than zero and  
 
  hl h l ww −< Π − Π   ■ 
 
In other words, when consumption is informative, the optimal incentive contract is 
characterized by a difference in wages that is smaller than ( ) hl Π −Π , which is the 
difference in the standard case when consumption is not informative.  
 
IV.c. Moral Costs Derived  
The principal agent literature sometimes assumes there is a “cost” to misbehaving and not 
doing what the principal expects. In the corruption applications of this literature the payoff 
from dishonesty typically includes a bribe but also a negative term often labeled a “moral 
cost”.
18 In this section we argue that our ideas about monitoring consumption can be used to 
derive a cost to illegal sources of income that plays a similar role.  
 
Proposition 3: Illegal income is less valuable than legal income.  
 
Proof: To see how moral costs can be derived, we follow the notation of the state contingent 
contract (for simplicity). The utility of the agent when he reports the state as low when it is 
in fact high is  
 
() ( ) () , () lhl l lhl Uw F ww m φφ +Π −Π − +Π −Π  
 
This can be rewritten as follows 
 
                                                 
18 The connection between morality and incentives is unappealing because sometimes incentives are not aligned 
properly for very large groups of people and it would be strange to claim that their actions are not moral (and, 
for example, they will not go to heaven). Put differently, even if the incentives in Argentina and Sweden were 
such that a majority (minority) of people in Argentina (Sweden) are corrupt, few would seriously claim that 
there are more good people in Sweden. Unless one takes the view that this life is a punishment for what we 
have done in previous lives. In the Hindu religion there is such a correlation across species (so bad humans end 




,( ) ,( )
lhl lhl lhl
ll h l l h ll h l
Uw F w w m
Fw w Fw w m
φφ
φφ
+Π −Π − +Π −Π +Π −Π −
+Π −Π − +Π −Π +Π −Π ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
 
 
Note that since F(.) is decreasing in the first argument, the term in squared brackets is 
positive.   ■ 
 
 
The first two terms are the utility units that the agent would get for a given level of income if 
this had all been earned legally. The third term (in squared brackets) is the difference in 
punishment because the income coming from illegal sources appears suspicious. The average 
effect is negative and plays a similar role as the “moral cost” often used in the literature (see, 





There are numerous examples of corruption being discovered because an agent was 
observed to enjoy an unexpectedly high standard of living, or, more precisely, a level of 
consumption that cannot be easily explained given the information available about the 
agent’s level of wealth prior to being hired. This suggests to us that there are potential 
benefits from designing incentive contracts and choosing agent type with the idea of using 
the information that is obtained from monitoring consumption.  
 
There are two basic effects of hiring agents on a high income. On the one hand, bribe offers 
are less tempting to the rich due to diminishing marginal utility. On the other, high levels of 
income also make any observed level of consumption less informative about any bribes 
taken by the agent. We discuss the general problem of choosing agents and monitoring 
consumption, as well as two applications to settings where corruption is common. The first 
is a setting where informal incentive contracts are prevalent, such as the control of a high 
level politician by the public. Our basic result is that we should not expect there to be a 
preference for rich politicians when corruption is a concern. It can also be shown that the   22
political class is expected to exhibit lower variance in consumption, for there to be higher 
value in monitoring the consumption of goods with high discount rates (such as education 
or health care) and for there to be higher gains from monitoring consumption and selecting 
agents according to wealth in countries with high tax rates.  
  
The second setting concerns the control of potentially corrupt bureaucrats through formal 
incentive contracts. In this case, paying generous wages has problems beyond the fiscal cost 
because it lowers the value of monitoring consumption. We also show that, when state 
contingent contracts are used, there is less separation between the wage in the good and in 
the bad state. This is provided as a potential explanation for why we have low powered 
incentive contracts in bureaucracies. The argument can be applied to wages that are not state 
contingent, such as efficiency wages. In this case monitoring consumption introduces a 
tendency for lower wages (and higher investment in detection), something that is one way of 
explaining popular resistance to pay politicians well. Finally, our analysis suggests that money 
made legitimately has higher value than illegitimate money. This introduces a way to derive 
the moral costs that are often assumed in models where agents take illicit actions.   23
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